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From Marxism-Leninism to Ethnicity: the Sideslips of Ethiopian Elitism 
Messay Kebede,  
University of Dayton, Dayton, Ohio 
 
For many scholars, colonialism and neocolonial policies remain the root causes of 
Africa’s numerous impediments, ranging from the persistence of poverty to the ravages 
of ethnic conflicts. However, the number of scholars who prefer to ascribe these 
impediments essentially to the persistence of traditional views and methods and to the 
lack of reforms radical enough to trigger a sustained process of modernization is not 
negligible. My position contests this either-or debate and identifies the culprit as the rise 
of African elitism--a phenomenon implicating the specific effect of colonialism in 
conjunction with internal African contributions. I take the case of Ethiopia as a pertinent 
illustration of the precedence of elitism over other hindrances. The fact that Ethiopia, 
though not colonized, has followed the same declining course as other African countries 
underlines the derailing role of modern education whose embedded Eurocentric 
orientations were quick to uproot those sectors of Ethiopian society which were exposed 
to it. The outcome was elitism, which spearheaded the trend of deeper marginalization 
and incapacitation of the country. But first, let me give a concrete meaning to the concept 
of elitism. 
 
What Is Elitism? 
The determination of elitism as a characteristic effect of colonial rule is not hard to 
establish. The first scholar who drew attention to the phenomenon of elitism in Africa is a 
Western missionary by the name of Placide Tempels. In his controversial book, Bantu 
Philosophy, written in 1945, Tempels defends the idea that the Bantu people have a 
rationally constructed philosophy. The revolutionary message of the book is easily 
admitted when it is recalled that the denial of philosophy, which was almost a universal 
European attitude, was the manner the rationality of Africans was contested. Since the 
denial was none other than the justification of colonialism as a civilizing mission, it is no 
surprise if many African scholars hail Tempels as “a real revolutionary, both in 
philosophy and in anticolonial discourse.”1  
 In addition to refuting the colonial allegation of irrational and immature peoples, 
Tempels has reflected on the evil consequences of denying philosophy to native peoples. 
The trend of considering the African cultural legacy as a collection of irrational and 
absurd beliefs, he noted, turned the clearing of the African mind of these beliefs into a 
prerequisite for the inculcation of Western ideas. Instead of dialogue and exchange of 
ideas, acculturation thus took the direction of uprooting natives on the grounds that they 
would become fit for Westernization only through the removal of their cultural legacy. 
Tempels consistently blames this colonial method for causing irreparable damages, 
especially for accelerating dehumanization and loss of centeredness among the Bantu. “In 
condemning the whole gamut of their supposed ‘childish and savage customs’ by the 
judgment ‘this is stupid and bad’, we [missionaries] have taken our share of the 
responsibility for having killed ‘the man’ in the Bantu,”2 he writes. 
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 A characteristic result of this inhuman method is the advent of the 
évolués–a French term to characterize those natives who supposedly evolve into civilized 
Africans as a result of colonial education. Tempels has no kind words to describe the 
évolués. He calls them from the start “déracinés and degenerates”3; elsewhere he speaks 
of them as “empty and unsatisfied souls--would be Europeans--and as such, negations of 
civilized beings,” as “moral and intellectual tramps, capable only, despite themselves, of 
being elements of strife.”4 All these severe flaws point the finger at colonial methods: 
molded to despise their legacy, these uprooted Africans have so internalized the colonial 
attitude that they end up by nurturing a contempt for their own peoples similar to that of 
the colonizer. To show that colonial education produces people with a colonizing turn of 
mind, Tempels stresses that the évolués “have no longer any respect for their old 
institutions, or for the usages and customs which, nevertheless, by their profound 
significance, form the basis of the practical application in Bantu life of natural law.”5 
Since the primary function of the évolués is to serve as a local instrument of colonial rule, 
their teaching, training, and mode of life dispose them to construe the dislike of their own 
legacy as a norm of civilized behavior.  
 In particular, when on top of being cut off from their society and pristine beliefs 
these évolués feel in their bones the inhumanity of their colonial masters, what else could 
rise within them but disillusionment and general cynicism? How can they avoid cynicism 
when, for all the loss of commitment to their tradition they have gone through, the 
colonial society still rejects them? Is it surprising if these would-be Europeans internalize 
all the vices of the colonizer without assimilating any of the positive aspects of 
modernity? Tempels fully understands the awkward position of the évolués: mesmerized 
by the power of the colonizer, yet repulsed by his racist contempt. He defines them as 
“profoundly distrustful or embittered,” by the obvious lack of “recognition of and respect 
for their full value as men by the Whites.”6 Because their hopes have been raised only to 
be knocked down without mercy, humiliation is for these people a source of constant 
torment. So mortifying is their humiliation that it seeks appeasement even in 
manifestations of eccentricity and megalomania, obvious as it is that the need to impress 
the colonizer at all costs grows into an itch.  
This means that the opposition of the évolués to colonial rule hides deeper 
emotional disorders of the kind pushing them toward negative and destructive behaviors. 
In this respect, the error has been to take at face value the rebellious stand of the évolués. 
No doubt, their role has been decisive in the struggle for independence. But one thing is 
to rise against an alien rule, quite another to develop an independent policy and turn of 
mind. To overlook this distinction is to miss the extent to which the perpetuation of the 
colonial rule under the guise of independence remains the appalling reality of Africa.  
 Let us agree to call African elitism the entitlement to an uncontested leadership 
inferred from the privilege of being exposed to modern education. The inference singles 
out the évolués as heirs to the civilizing mission. It is as though Westernization passes on 
to local elites the right to rule, that is, to continue the unfinished business of colonialism. 
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In other words, to rule is still a civilizing mission with this difference that it is 
assumed by natives rescued from primitiveness. The entitlement to rule maintains the 
belief that Africans are indeed primitive, and so calls for methods of government similar 
to the colonial rule. The reality of native rulers thinking and acting like former colonizers 
makes up the substance of African elitism. Basil Davidson has described well the process 
of its institution thus:  
The regimes installed at independence became rapidly subject to upsets and 
uproars. Striving to contain these, the multi-party parliamentary systems gave way 
increasingly, whether in theory or practice, to one-party system. Most of these 
one-party systems at this stage, perhaps all of them, decayed into no-party 
systems as their ruling elements became fully bureaucratized. Politics came to an 
end; mere administration took its place, reproducing colonial autocracy as the new 
‘beneficiaries’ took the place of the old governors.7 
.  
Colonialism, it follows, remains the major source of hindrance not so much by its 
plunders and destructions--which though not negligible were nevertheless reparable--as 
by its ideological legacy. The colossal human wreckage caused by the internalization of 
the colonial discourse and so aptly personified by the évolués is how Africa was handed 
over to psychopathic personalities.  
 To be specific, what defines elitism is the normative union of knowledge with 
power, that is, the assumption that those who get exposed to Western education should 
also rule. Behind this entitlement to rule, we find the ethos of the évolués who, having 
internalized the Western discourse, take on the task of rescuing their society from 
barbarism and ignorance. It is because modernization is perceived as a passage from 
savagery to civilization that knowledge, enlightenment entitles one to power. So defined, 
modernization construes power as tutorship, and so designates the educated elite as the 
legitimate heir to colonial rule. The situation, then, is that educated Africans present 
themselves, in the words of Davidson, 
as those who were to be the instruments of applying the European model to 
Africa, and therefore as the saviours of the continent. Being sure of the values of 
their Western education, they were convinced of their superiority over their vast 
majority: who but they, after all, possessed the keys to the powerhouse of 
knowledge whence European technology and conquest had flowed?8  
 
 The assignment to civilize completely redefines the role of the state. According to 
the influential liberal theory, modern states implicate a contract of citizens among 
themselves and with the government as a result of which the latter becomes accountable 
to the former. Classical Marxist theory insists that the contract does not involve the 
working people, there being no doubt that governments protect the interests of ruling 
classes. The attribution of a modernizing role to the state adds a civilizing mission to the 
normal administrative and political functions of the state. In other words, following the 
colonial paradigm, from representative of social forces the state grows into a tutor. And 
who can direct this state if not those natives who have access to Western knowledge. 
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Since civilization must come from outside, power must become tutorship. This 
equation produces elitism in all its various forms.  
 One African scholar who has closely studied the phenomenon of elitism and its 
negative effects is V. Y. Mudimbe. Specifically referring to “elitism and Western 
dependency,”9 Mudimbe shows that both are products of Africans talked into the 
smearing of African past and legacy by Western indoctrination. The proven method of 
the indoctrination is “the static binary opposition between tradition and modernity”10 
whose consequence is to rule out the presentation of modernity as an extension, a 
continuation of tradition. Pushed to the other side of modernity, tradition appears as the 
major obstacle that must be liquidated for evolution to take off. The consent to this 
liquidation precisely produces the évolué as the one who, having a foot in both the 
modern and traditional worlds, best promotes the hierarchical order of colonialism by 
serving as a reliable liaison between colonized and colonizers.   
 It scarcely need be pointed out that the acquiescence of Africans to the colonial 
description of African tradition is what nurtures the elitist mentality by reviving the 
évolué sleeping in every “educated” African. It causes a characteristic blur assimilating 
the use of colonial conceptions and methods to an enlightened and positive approach. As 
a result of this mix-up,  
the indigenous societies of Africa will be not so much transformed as replaced by 
modern, secular societies; and the key agents of this process will be indigenous 
elites, including business elites or capitalists, conceive of as bearers of the 
necessary universal values of global modernity.11 
 
As substitutes for colonizers and in default of being able to whiten themselves, the 
évolués resolve on a condescending and paternalistic attitude which, however far it falls 
short of being racist, is nevertheless entitlement to privilege and uncontested leadership.  
 To sum up, the elitist attitude echoes the colonial mentality means that the moral 
bankruptcy of the educated elite is a direct consequence of the endorsement of the idea of 
primitive Africa. The act by which Africans welcome Western education is the act by 
which they acquiesce to the colonial discourse on Africa: the one is inseparable from the 
other. As a result, educated Africans are unable to adopt a moral standard: the contempt--
mostly unconscious--that they feel for Africanness totally deprives them of ethical 
relationships with themselves and their original society. Disdain and non-accountability 
appear to them as the only way by which they demonstrate their complete emancipation 
from their legacy. Imperative, therefore, is the recognition as a major explanation of 
African numerous impediments the fact that modern African states have simply replaced 
the colonial states. Because “Africans replaced the Europeans officials right to the top of 
the bureaucracy”12 without the prior dismantling of the colonial state and methods, 
especially without a far-reaching decolonization of the educated and political elites, small 
wonder the same structure and turn of mind produce similar results. 
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The Ethiopian Drift into Elitism 
A noticeable and important distinction between Ethiopia and other African countries is, 
we know, its escape from colonization after a decisive military victory in 1896 over a 
colonial power. Combined with the other distinctive characteristics of Ethiopia, namely, 
the protracted existence of an Ethiopian state (the so-called Solomonic dynasty) with a 
well-defined class structure (the gebar system) and a nationalist ideology (the Kibre 
Negest), the repulsion of colonial aggression announced the inevitability of the rise of an 
African power on a par with modern European states. So promising was the prospect that 
many observers predicted the repetition of the Japanese experience by Ethiopia. To show 
that expectation was high in Europe, especially after the victory of Adwa, a Paris journal, 
La liberté editorialized: "All European countries will be obliged to make a place for this 
new brother who steps forth ready to play in the dark continent the role of Japan in the 
Far East."13 
 In light of this expectation, the failure and underdevelopment of Ethiopia turn into 
an appalling enigma, all the more so as the usual explanation of the African impediment 
by colonialism is here ruled out. Ethiopia escaped colonization means essentially that 
power and ideological leadership did not devolve on the évolués. Instead, there was a 
remarkable continuity, as evidenced by the opening of Ethiopia to the modern world 
through the agency of its traditional ruling elite. So that, this fact of Ethiopia becoming 
underdeveloped while no leadership of the évolué type hampered its evolution seems to 
backfire on my thesis ascribing the African predicament to elitism. If there is one country 
in Africa that was protected against the rise of the évolués, this country was Ethiopia.  
 Let us not rush to conclusions, however. Ethiopia’s escape from the political 
domination of colonialism must be viewed against the background of the large doors that 
it naïvely opened to Western education in the name of modernization. In our study of the 
évolués, we have emphasized that the disastrous consequences of colonial conquest result 
less from economic and social disruptions than from mental colonization. Accordingly, 
the reckless opening of Ethiopia to modern education brings us back to the same issue of 
elitism with even greater strength, since we catch the uprooting and alienating effect of 
such an education working in a sovereign way. It shows that the inglorious and 
cumbersome conquest of Africa was not necessary: to achieve the colonization of the 
mind, with its set of marginalizing thinking, copyism, and dictatorial methods, in short, 
elitism, the spreading of Western education was enough. 
 Nowhere is this truth better illustrated than in the radicalization of Ethiopian 
student movements and educated circles in the 60s and 70s. True, this radicalism 
implicates Haile Selassie’s postponement of necessary social and political reforms. But 
the postponement does not fully explain the shift to radicalism: a predisposition 
portraying the ills of Ethiopian society as so entrenched and stubborn that nothing less 
than a radical reshuffling was required must be added to the lack of reforms. The 
overwhelming dominance of revolutionary mood over reformist tendencies cannot be 
satisfactorily explained otherwise than by the corrosive effects of Western education on 
the student movements and intelligentsia. The dichotomy between tradition and 
                                                 
13
 Quoted by Robert Hess, Ethiopia: The Modernization of Autocracy (Ithaca: Cornell University, 1970), p. 
59. 
 6 
modernity and the subsequent presentation of the break with tradition as a necessary 
precondition of modernization--this bedrock of Western education--explains the leaning 
toward revolutionary analyses to the detriment of reformist remedies. 
  This analysis finds a remarkable support in Tekeste Negash’s book, The Crisis of 
Ethiopian Education. In that book, Tekeste brings out the essentially uprooting role that 
modern education has assumed in Ethiopia during Haile Selassie's reign and, with greater 
reason, during Derg’s “socialist” rule. In his eyes, the teaching of a "boundless hatred of 
their country and its society"14 to students has been the main purpose of modern 
education. Its outcome has been the elitist mentality, which talked students into 
perceiving themselves as "infallible semi-gods"15 destined for undivided leadership. 
Tekeste traces back the origin of this megalomania to the ideological vacuum created by 
the distortion and neglect of the teaching of Ethiopian history. Taught only in grade ten, 
Ethiopian history was pictured by textbooks, especially by those of the Derg, as the 
unspeakable reign of a rotten feudal system whose backwardness and limitless 
exploitation of peasants condemned the country to be one of the poorest nations in the 
world. In thus squarely blaming tradition and the past for the present ills without 
balancing it with an account of the positive side, the history course amounted to an 
infusion of "shame, contempt and disgust."16 Such remarkable realizations as the 
evolving of "a political state that endured for nearly two thousand years" and the 
achievement of a rich and varied culture which integrated different ethnic groups into "a 
functioning political framework"17 were systematically downplayed.  
 This grave deficiency together with the systematic pursuit of debasement 
prompted Tekeste to speak of a "curriculum" with a "strikingly colonial character."18 
Even though, unlike the Derg, Haile Selassie had constantly pleaded for an approach 
balancing tradition and modernity, his prudence was nullified by his reliance on a 
massive foreign teaching corps whose commitment to Ethiopian interests was peripheral 
as well as by his intention to use modern education to consolidate his own autocratic rule. 
The debasement has today reached its climax with the establishment of an ethnic regime 
and the proliferation of ethnic movements whose grudges against the Ethiopian state, 
however legitimate they may be, are so excessive and one-sided that they echo the 
colonial disparagement of whatever is natively African. On the strength of his conviction 
that "underdevelopment cannot be overcome until such time when the citizens of a 
country begin to appreciate their history,"19 Tekeste advises that "the cultivation of 
Ethiopian nationalism and patriotism . . . deserves priority."20   
 The history of Ethiopian intellectual movement squarely confirms the merit of 
this analysis. Let us take the case of the first intellectuals, those whose contributions took 
place before the Italian occupation of 1935. Addis Hiwet called them “Japanizers” 
because they who saw in the transformation of the post-Meiji modernization of Japan “a 
living model for Ethiopia: the liquidation of feudalism and the development of capitalism 
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through the agency of the modern state--i.e. a revolution from above.”21 Yet the label 
“Japanizers”, appealing though it may be, is misleading if only because the predominant 
inspiration of said intellectuals was less to modernize tradition than to copy the West. Not 
only did they openly call for the establishment of Haile Selassie’s autocratic rule through 
the disablement of the Ethiopian nobility that they considered as incorrigibly reactionary 
and rotten, but most of them had also a profoundly iconoclastic view of Ethiopian culture 
and traditions. None of these views reflects the Japanese style, which took, we know, an 
integrative course resulting in the incorporation of many traditional elements into the 
process of modernization, besides avoiding the path of autocracy.  
 The alienation of these first intellectuals is best exemplified by Afework Gebre 
Yesus, the author of Tobbya. A great admirer of the West, Afework crossed the threshold 
of treason by turning into a staunch collaborator of the Italians during their occupation of 
Ethiopia. His tragedy is symptomatic of the deep contradiction of the Ethiopian 
intellectual movement: he loved Ethiopia as much as he admired the West. The 
conviction that the Ethiopian ruling class was utterly reluctant to modernization led him 
to endorse colonization as the only means to modernize Ethiopia. The error is to see his 
move as an accident or an exception: Afework was simply consistent. For him, since 
modernization means Westernization, what matters is the resolution to modernize, not the 
specific nationality of the modernizing agent. In this regard, the Ethiopian ruling elite has 
demonstrated its non-candidacy by its utter reactionary views and policy. So that, 
Afework’s treason, correctly analyzed, reflects the hidden inspiration of all Ethiopians 
exposed to Western education, to wit, the longing for colonization. Whether this 
colonization is effected by Westerners or natives is immaterial so long as the contents and 
the goal are clearly set. We can even say, as Afework did, that the original being better 
than the copy, a direct colonization will achieve better results than modernization by 
proxy. Accordingly, the truth is that, while some of the first Ethiopian intellectuals, to 
quote Bahru Zewde, “may have fleetingly considered foreign rule as a way out for their 
country’s backwardness, few went as far as Afework did.”22   
 The other most important figure among the “Japanizers,” namely, Gebre Hiwot 
Baykedagn, while ruling out recourse to foreign rule, arrives at the same image of 
Ethiopia in deadlock. For him too, the archaic beliefs and customs of Ethiopia and the 
hopelessly conservative attitude of the nobility and the clergy stand in the way of 
Ethiopian modernization. The solution is to get rid of these obstacles, the instrument 
being this time, not foreign rule, but Western education. The main goal is to produce an 
elite capable of replacing the nobility and the clergy. This strategy of replacing the 
traditional elite with Western educated state servants had one prerequisite: the rise of an 
autocrat who would be powerful enough to marginalize the traditional elite. Thus, 
following his belief that what Ethiopia needs is “a man of order, energy, intellect and 
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experience . . . who is both a friend of Progress and Absolutism,”23 Gebre Hiwot 
identified Haile Selassie as the most appropriate candidate. 
 The deviations of these two representatives of the early intellectuals of Ethiopia 
indicate where lies the difference between them and those of the 60s. Undoubtedly, a 
deeper assessment of the Ethiopian deadlock and a complete loss of confidence on the 
traditional elite as well as on the emerging modern sectors single out the educated men 
and women of the 60s. The reluctance of Haile Selassie to apply reforming measures and 
the apparent connivance of the “bourgeois” sectors will lead to greater desperation about 
a class or a sector of Ethiopian society ever assuming the leading role in the positive 
transformation of Ethiopia. Totally abandoning the Japanizers’ call for an autocrat, the 
intellectuals of the 60s came round to the idea that intellectuals themselves must seize 
power to implement the necessary reforms.  
 In this regard, no theory has been more influential than Leninism. In particular, 
the views that Lenin develops in his famous book, What Is To Be Done, appeared 
relevant to Ethiopia. Under the pretext that in the era of imperialism native aristocratic or 
bourgeois classes prefer alliance with imperialist forces to a revolutionary change, Lenin 
develops the principle that intellectuals, going beyond their normal role as bureaucrats, 
technicians, researchers, educators, and critics, should also become political leaders. To 
the perceived deadlock of Third World countries, itself due to the absence of a 
revolutionary bourgeoisie, Lenin proposes the theory of revolutionary intellectuals as a 
substitute. His argument that power and knowledge must come into the same hands is 
further strengthened by his assumption that, left to itself, the working class would be 
“able to develop only trade-union consciousness” so that the leadership must pass on to 
“the educated representatives of the propertied classes, the intellectuals” 24 Other Marxist 
intellectuals (Antonio Gramsci, Mao Tse-tung, Frantz Fanon, etc.) have added their 
voice, turning the conjunction of power and knowledge into a credo of revolutionary 
movements in Third World countries. 
 What is one to conclude from this? That the radicalization of the Ethiopian 
student movements and educated circles in the 60s and 70s, especially their strong 
leaning toward Marxism-Leninism, no doubt a product of the deferment of reforms, is a 
logical development of the growing impact of Western education. To the question why 
the reformist option was marginalized, the answer is that the theory that best produced an 
iconoclastic analysis of Ethiopia, of its ruling class and beliefs, was none other than 
Marxism-Leninism. Despite its undeniable commitment to justice and equality, the theory 
echoes the colonial description of native societies by its evolutionary views, its rejection 
of traditionality, and most of all, by the historical role that it assigns to the évolués. 
Moreover, the theory would not have had such influence were it not arousing and 
legitimizing the political ambition of educated circles. In a word, it is the theory that 
gives elitism its most powerful backing.  
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 What we know of Ethiopian student movements and Marxist Leninist parties, be 
it the EPRP or MEISON, confirms their elitist drift. All referred to the reality of the 
Ethiopian social impasse and, agreeing with Leninism, thought the way out to be the 
seizure of political power by radicalized intellectuals. The move creates a new type of 
power, that is, a power aiming at liberating the masses rather than enforcing a particular 
interest. In a word, it creates a tutorial power: in the name of a class or large sections of 
the people, conceived unfit to conquer political hegemony, an enlightened group aspires 
to or seizes power. It claims to have the mandate for tutorship until the class or the people 
become mature enough to assume the task of self-government. Because politics thus 
shifts from administration to domestication, elitism is unthinkable without the assignment 
to modernize, itself understood in terms of snatching the ignorant masses from 
traditionality. Entirely agreeing with the colonial paradigm of civilizing mission, elitism 
asserts that, in light of the larger society being immobilized by centuries of apathy, 
fatalism, and barbarism, salvation must come from outside, from the enlightened few. 
When leading Ethiopian intellectuals hailed the revolutionary role of organized 
intellectuals, little did they realize that they were advocating a revamped version of the 
colonial rule.  
 Most importantly, Ethiopian intellectuals did not realize how implacably they 
were heading towards a dictatorial regime in the name of the people. The way they 
described themselves and their goal could not but institute dictatorship for the simple 
reason that the moral authority and selfness they bestowed on themselves as liberators of 
the working peoples turned them into semi-gods with no accountability to any social 
force. So disinterested and generous a goal is by definition beyond any question and so 
demands absolute submission. This is how a former activist describes his comrades: 
“EPRP’s leading activists had no hidden agenda except struggling for what they believed 
was just--the well being of the Ethiopian poor . . . I am convinced that Ethiopia still 
mourns the death of its brightest and selfless children” 25 
 In thus presenting themselves as having no particular interest, nay, as being 
beyond any interest except the cause of the poor, the intellectuals puffed themselves with 
such a moral authority that they soared above accountability, thereby giving themselves 
over to the worst type of paternalism. Relations among people can never be on an equal 
footing if the one party claims that it has no other interest and motivation than those of 
the other party. Such a claim annuls equality by turning the one into a granter and the 
other into a grantee. It is high time that intellectuals present themselves to the Ethiopian 
peoples as ordinary persons having specific interests and many limitations. Only thus can 
they evolve a contractual relationships with the masses whose support they need to 
defend their interests in the framework of a pluralist society. Only when they admit that 
they have particular interests can they get out of paternalism by clearly understanding 
that in defending the interests of the masses they are but defending their own particular 
interests. This is called general interest and partnership as a result of solidarity being 
created on the basis of mutual interests and not on the one party granting rights to the 
other party and deceitfully claiming to be without interest.  
 Crucially important was that most people became convinced that elitism was the 
way to go. Allow me to resort to my own experience. I still remember vividly the time 
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when people, especially women, were cheering us in the streets with yililta the 
first day of the opening of schools after the long vacation of the rainy season. We were 
then a bunch of kids going from the gulele area where we lived to the French school of 
Lycée Guebre Mariam on foot. Nothing was more expressive of the popular expectation 
than this cheering crowd. The Ethiopian saying, yetemare yigdelegn, best incarnates the 
expectation that modern schools produce the saviors of Ethiopia. Without doubt, this 
popularization of modern education goes to the credit of Haile Selassie. Thanks to his 
constant exhortation and the direct involvement of his uncontested authority, the popular 
response was not hard to come by: as a scholar notes “even bearded and senior men push 
their way into the schools, humbly but determinedly anxious, like their children, to learn 
English.”26 The prestige of being Western educated was such that the legitimation of 
power became unthinkable without some intellectual halo. And what could be more 
sanctifying than the brandishing of the theory of Marxism-Leninism? On top of claiming 
to be entirely scientific, the theory has an answer to all the questions. Above all, its deep 
humanitarian goals give it an unmatched moral authority. All this worked toward the 
belief that Marxism-Leninism alone entitles to power.  
 The irony, however, is that Ethiopian Marxist-Leninists were beaten at their own 
game by a sector of the military apparatus. Consecutive to the overthrow of the imperial 
regime, a group of military men, calling itself the Derg, hijacked the Marxist-Leninist 
discourse and rose to power by claiming to have the historic mission of leading the 
country toward socialism. To crown it all, the man who was among those that the 
criterion of high education least advantaged, namely Menguistu Haile Mariam, emerged 
as the uncontested leader of the Derg and established an absolute power. Yet, something 
of the intellectual justification remained, since Menguistu presented himself as the most 
dedicated promoter of Marxism-Leninism. To prove his commitment, in default of 
having the intellectual references, Menguistu resorted to terror and killing, the only way 
he knew to impress and convinced Ethiopians and the then socialist countries that he was 
indeed a true Marxist. This is to say that the intellectualization of power is responsible for 
both creating the Derg and causing the erratic and sanguinary behavior of Menguistu. No 
sooner is the state viewed as more of a tutor than an administrator, in line with the 
colonial idea of civilizing mission, than it ceases to be accountable to the society. You 
cannot recognize people as sovereign judges while believing that they are ignorant, 
passive, and unable to govern themselves. Democratic attitude requires the respect of the 
people, a course of thinking that elitism cannot adopt, diverted as it is by the mentality of 
the évolué. 
 Granted that the exposure to Western education has prepared the ground for the 
adoption of Marxist-Leninist approach in Ethiopia, the fact remains that the adherence to 
the theory would not have been systematic and widespread without the Eritrean issue. 
Though Ethiopia was not colonized, the centeredness of the traditionalist thinking was 
irremediably contaminated from within by the annexation of Eritrea, which was an Italian 
colony since 1890. The immediate result of the incorporation was that Eritrea became the 
Trojan horse of colonialism, especially in schools and among students as well as among 
military officers. The undermining from within of Ethiopian centeredness took two 
interrelated directions. The one direction has to do with many Eritreans having no or lost 
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loyalty to the Ethiopian ruling elite: their involvement in the Ethiopian society 
introduced a dissenting voice that was bound to be catching. It specially targeted the 
Amhara ruling elite for which most Eritreans had but contempt. Essentially inherited 
from the colonial time, this contempt considered the Amhara as utterly backward and the 
Eritreans as civilized, évolué. This view made the Amhara rule particularly intolerable so 
that the Italian colonization of Ethiopia, though it failed militarily, was revived by the 
Eritrean incorporation. 
 The second direction points to the Eritrean input into the radicalization of 
Ethiopian student and intellectual movements. To accommodate the Eritrean dissent, 
especially to counter the separatist tendency, the Ethiopian students movements and 
intellectuals had to agree to a radical reshuffling of Ethiopian society. They had to 
contemplate the end of the monarchy and all that it represents, thereby forsaking the 
reformist line. The radical theory of Marxism-Leninism was most welcome as it claimed 
to provide a solution to the question of nationalities. As theorized by Marxism-Leninism, 
the only genuine response to the Eritrean unrest could only be the absolute equality of all 
the nationalities based on the class interests of the working masses and the institution of 
regional autonomy. As one former member of the EPRP wrote:  
the majority of the Ethiopian radicals did not accept the inevitability of Eritrean 
independence. They believed that the recognition of the right to self-
determination and the expediency of the formation of an independent state were 
two separate issues. They were still hopeful that, in the proper circumstances, 
class solidarity would prevail over nationalism and Eritreans would choose to 
remain with Ethiopia. 27 
 
It is my firm contention that without the attempt to accommodate the Eritrean demands, 
no major drift into Marxism-Leninism would have occurred, and by extension, no 
ethnicization of Ethiopian politics would have resulted. As in other countries, the radical 
option would have attracted a minority while the rest would have stood for a reformist 
course.  
 
From Marxism-Leninism to Ethnicity 
Unsurprisingly, the separatist tone of the Eritrean resistance had a great impact on the 
Tigrean educated elite. Already sensitized by the protracted rivalry between Amhara and 
Tigrean ruling elites and upset by the marginalization of Tigray following the triumphant 
establishment of a centralized monarchy under Haile Selassie, the Tigrean educated elite 
was but ready to push the ethnic issue as the major problem of Ethiopia. Also, 
neighborliness, linguistic identity, blood relationships, etc., worked toward a 
rapprochement between Tigrean and Eritrean analyses of Ethiopia even if, it is true, few 
Tigreans endorsed the Eritrean view of the Ethiopian state as a colonial rule.  
 To unravel the connection between Marxist-Leninist ideology and ethno-
nationalism, it is necessary first to reflect on the colonial ideology itself, especially on the 
promotion of the idea of race in conjunction with colonial racism. Indeed, one lasting 
legacy of the colonial rule in Africa is the categorization of peoples as belonging to 
different and unequal human races. That this colonial heritage has opened the door to the 
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ethnicization of African social life is not hard to establish. Fanon, for instance, gives 
a good idea of the logical connection between race and ethnicity when he elaborates on 
his warning that the mere replacement of colonial rulers by Africans will only indulge in 
a dependent policy reproducing the syndromes of colonial governments. In postcolonial 
Africa, he notes, “we observe a falling back toward old tribal attitudes, and, furious and 
sick at heart, we perceive that race feeling in its most exacerbated form is triumphing.”28 
Inherited from colonial mentality, the rise of ethnicity is thus nothing more than racism in 
the African style. It is definitely an expression of colonized mentality in that it classifies, 
separates, excludes peoples on the basis of natural characteristics. To show that the 
dependent African elite exactly reproduces the principle of colonial rule, Fanon reminds 
us how “by its very structure, colonialism is separatist and regionalist. Colonialism does 
not simply state the existence of tribes; it also reinforces it and separates them.”29  
 This is to say that people who have come under colonial rule have great 
propensity to value ethnic belonging. If so, the conceptualization of ethnic issues as the 
major problem of Ethiopia must be attributed to the ethnicization of the Eritrean 
opposition, which ethnicization is an outcome of the colonial heritage of Eritrea. For 
those who doubt the connection, I remind that the view of Ethiopia as an Amhara colony, 
before being espoused by Eritreans and some Oromo intellectuals, was an idea that 
Italians had originated to undermine the Ethiopian resistance. They have promoted the 
notion of “Greater Tigre” as well as that of “Greater Somalia,” and during the five years 
of occupation have divided Ethiopia along ethnic lines to activate “the revolt of the non-
Amhara populations such as the Oromo and the Muslims.”30 This reminder of the 
colonial authorship of the assimilation of the Ethiopian regime to a colonial rule only 
strengthens the extent to which Eritrean and Ethiopian ethno-nationalist movements feed 
on the colonial view of Ethiopia. 
 Naturally, the Eritrean characterization of Ethiopia had a prime seductive effect 
on Tigrean and Oromo educated circles. The rivalry between Amhara and Tigrean elites 
and the injustice of the land ownership in the south respectively paved the way for the 
ethnicization of Tigrean and Oromo intellectuals. While Tigreans denounced Amhara 
domination, some Oromo intellectuals, going further in the direction of the colonial 
theory, began to target the disintegration of Ethiopia and the emergence of an 
independent Oromia. The part played by missionary education in the generation of 
Oromo intellectuals committed to secession should not be ignored, given that the 
secessionist trend is unthinkable without significant encroachments, Protestant or 
otherwise, on the advances of Orthodox Christianity. This authorizes us to characterize 
the rise of ethnicity in Ethiopia as a contamination of legitimate grievances with racist 
views through the agency of Eritrea. As Leenco Lata admits, “Eritrea’s incorporation into 
Ethiopia thus unexpectedly resulted in heightening the grievances of other southern 
peoples.”31 Seeing how people easily give in to the pragmatic criterion of success as an 
expression of truth, little wonder the definite impact of Eritrean resistance on Ethiopian 
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opposition movements has been their growing conviction that ethnicization 
conditions success. 
 Another explanation of the shift from Marxism-Leninism to ethnicity is the 
resonance of the ethnic paradigm with the Leninist ideal as it appears in What Is to Be 
Done. The odyssey of selfless intellectuals liberating the working people from class 
exploitation is replayed with even greater fervor when these intellectuals think of freeing 
from ethnic oppression none other than their own kin. Equally relevant to ethnic 
mobilization is the Leninist supposition that working people need tutors to defend their 
interests. In addition to being taught to identify their separate interests, the ethnically 
oppressed need tutors whose devotion is warranted by the sharing of the same blood. 
That is why, just as Marxist-Leninists leaders do, ethnic nationalists like to theorize. The 
possession of a theory of history is what lifts them from ordinary politicians to saviors 
and liberators of their people. This theoretical aptitude, in turn, establishes their exclusive 
legitimacy. Just as Marxist-Leninist groups used to claim the exclusive right to represent 
the interest of the working masses, so too ethnic movements deny other groups the right 
to represent people if they are not ethnically related to them. This battle for legitimacy 
was effectively fought in Ethiopia: while the MAESON and the EPRP claimed “the 
exclusive right to implement Lenin’s formula in Ethiopia . . . the TPLF adamantly 
rejected such a subordination of national liberation struggle to class struggle. By doing 
so, it succeeded to fend off these parties’ encroachment into Tigrean society.”32 
 A pertinent and recent example of the theoretical mania of ethnic movements is 
the debate that Meles Zenawi forced on his party to justify the dismissal of his opponents. 
The debate introduced the concept of “Banapartism” and the idea of “new 
Ethiopianness.”33 Given that Meles had in mind nothing more than the denunciation of 
the dangers of corruption, his reference to Bonapartism--a concept borrowed from Karl 
Marx--has clearly no other purpose than to link his discourse with a prestigious theory of 
revolution. In this way, not only does he impress his Tigrean basis, but he also exposes 
the theoretical poverty of his opponents, in particular demotes the military glory that they 
brandish at him. One can only agree with those delegates who could find no other way to 
express their bewilderment than to ask: “was it necessary to identify the problem as 
‘Bonapartism?’”34 Some of them accused Meles of sabotaging the agenda of the meeting 
by putting forward an “unnecessary and obscure” notion, “just to pass off as a scholar.”35  
Precisely, perfectly aware of the importance of theoretical ascendancy in the 
justification of power in Third World countries, Meles grasps with both hands the 
opportunity of following in the footsteps of Lenin, Mao Tse-tung, Kwame Nkrumah, etc., 
by playing the role of the philosopher-king to an audience longing for theoretical 
absolutions in default of possessing a high level of intellectual sophistication. We find 
theoretical ability ranked as the major requisite for leadership in the interview that Meles 
recently gave to Abyotawi Democracy, the official journal of the EPRDF. In that 
interview, Meles explains his own ascendancy thus:  
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What is important is the clarity of vision. Once you possess clarity in vision 
and a correct political line, competent leaders will necessarily emerge. From this 
viewpoint, the splinter group’s lack of clarity and incorrect political line is one 
that has lost track and is bound to lead them to confusion. It is impossible to 
provide competent leadership while one is in such a state of confusion.36  
  
 One serious objection springs to mind: insofar as ethnicity is an attempt to return 
to the past and revive traditional identities and commitments, is it not contradictory to tie 
it to the colonized mind? Is not the search for a precolonial authenticity turning its back 
on the colonial legacy and modeling? No doubt, there is some such meaning. However, 
other than echoing, as we saw, the racist categorization of colonialism, the shift from 
Marxism-Leninism to ethno-nationalism involves the elitist ethos. Indeed, scholars have 
been struck by the modernist language of ethnicity: it speaks in terms of justice, 
democracy, self-determination, and educated groups are its most ardent supporters and 
leaders. Because of this modern content, many scholars rightly warn against any 
identification of ethnicity with tribalism. Yet behind the modern and democratic 
language, there looms an ascriptive entitlement to power. As one scholar notes, “the 
rigidity of ascriptive characteristics that define ethnicity compared to the fluidity of 
alternative bases of identity (especially class) accounts for the comparative advantage of 
ethnicity in sustaining group solidarity.”37 In going back to the past, elites discover a new 
form of entitlement: the ascriptive right of kinship. According to this principle, the 
representatives of ethnic groups have or exercise power as a matter of natural right, of 
belonging to the same natural group. They are the natural representatives of the group; 
their entitlement is in the blood, in the ethnic belonging. No other people have the right to 
represent them: others are precisely outsiders. Nor is there a more compelling principle of 
unity than natural solidarity; it even transcends classes and common economic interests. 
Class mobilization maintains the entrenched disadvantages by subordinating particular 
interests to common interests when what excluded groups need is the defense of their 
particularity. Because the alleged common interests usually favor the dominant ethnic 
group, minority groups prefer ethnic mobilization to class unity. 
 But then, ethnicity is where the ideology of unanimity, deposited in the Leninist 
notion of working masses, achieves its perfect expression. Grant that “ethnic 
nationalism” is “a divide-and rule strategy,”38 as Leenco now concedes, and the ethnic 
group becomes the embodiment of unanimism: besides having common characteristics 
and history, members of an ethnic group are supposed to think alike and to have a 
common interest beyond class and status divisions. Better still, ethnic solidarity is 
presented as a normative behavior on the grounds that kinspersons are the most devoted 
representatives of the ethnic group. No better way exists to deliver a whole people in the 
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hands of elitism than to promise a breakaway ethnic state or a state 
functioning on the basis of ethnic solidarity.  
39
 Recall the logic that pushes Nkrumah to argue in favor of the one-party system. It 
says that the one-party system “is better able to express and satisfy the common 
aspirations of a nation as whole, than a multiple-party parliamentary system, which is in 
fact only a ruse for perpetuating, and covers up, the inherent struggle between the ‘haves’ 
and the ‘haves-nots.’”40 Evidently, the principle works beautifully well for ethnicist 
politicians whose basic credo is the origination of common aspirations from ethnic 
membership. Not only ethnic solidarity replaces class solidarity, the dividing line being 
here between the ethnically related and the alien, but also diversity is believed to be 
detrimental to the struggle. The notion of ethnicity is thus responsible for illusory 
conceptions of unity that loses sight of the social, economic, and ideological diversity 
within the ethnic group. From the alleged ethnic identity, it is wrongly deduced that all 
members think alike. This allows despots to stifle differences and initiatives in the name 
of the ethnic unanimity: all that is dynamic, plural, and democratic is stigmatized as un-
ethnical.   
 The enthronement of the enlightened few, who alone illuminate the road to 
freedom, follows as a matter of course. Nothing is more captivating than the elitist image 
of rescuer: dragged from their natural society and subjugated to an alien power, the 
oppressed ethnic groups need the tutorial leadership that puts them back into their 
authentic and original milieu. The ethnicist leader who claims to deliver his people from 
ethnic oppression gives no different spectacle from, say, that of Nkrumah forcefully 
implementing African socialism on a people that he otherwise declared to be socialist by 
tradition. In both cases, the elitist slip clearly transpires in the call for a tutorial state. 
There is no disparity between the ethnic principle of popular mobilization behind the 
enlightened few and Nkrumah’s pronouncement on the success of the anti-colonial 
struggle. For both movements, success depends on the intervention of those who control 
knowledge. As Nkrumah puts it,  
this triumph must be accompanied by knowledge. For in the way that the process 
of natural evolution can be aided by human intervention based upon knowledge, 
so social evolution can be helped along by political intervention based upon 
knowledge of the laws of social development.41 
 
 Clearly, then, the imperative of a mass party guided by the enlightened few is how 
power and knowledge fall into the same hands, and government, thus armed with an 
ideology, changes into tutorship. The ethnic ideology of the return to the source gives a 
messianic stature to local elites, turn them into rescuers of the oppressed. Once ethnic 
solidarity becomes the principal rule, it stifles all dissident views by authorizing the 
characterization of all internal opposition as a betrayal of common interests. It exactly 
institutes unanimity around the leadership canonized as the sole interpreter of the 
interests of the ethnic group. As was the case with Marxist-Leninist groups, this apology 
of unanimism is a justification for dictatorial regimes and undemocratic methods of 
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ruling. If both ideologies converge on the necessity of the one-party system and the 
banishment of dissident views as well as on the rejection of individualism and the praise 
of the collective, it is because they work toward the goal of consecrating the absolute 
power of the enlightened few. The attraction of Marxist-Leninist groups to ethnicity is 
therefore inherent in the nature of ethnicity itself. If, as Leenco remarks, “the members of 
the fronts that were more successful in implementing the Leninist organizational strategy 
tended not only to act as one person but to speak as one, too,”42 how much more so may 
ethnic leaders and the ethnic society they fashion. 
 This analysis of ethnicity must not be interpreted as a condemnation of ethnic 
politics in Ethiopia. The fact that an excluded group organizes itself and fights the 
exclusion cannot be rejected without going against democratization. Moreover, the 
inclusion of pluralism strongly favors the development of modern values by stimulating 
openness and competition. What is adverse, however, is the tendency of ethnic politics to 
harbor a separatist spirit by identifying the nation with the ethnic group. The use of 
ethnicity to break up the state confuses what is essentially a problem of democratization 
with the emergence of a new ethnic state whose democratization is yet to come. Because 
ethnically related people now control the state, issues pertaining to democratization and 
modernization are not done away with yet. On the contrary, the ideology of relatedness 
can even get tougher to democratize inasmuch as it is little prone to the impersonalization 
of the state. The question is then to know to what extent the defense of the ascriptive 
rights of ethnicity is compatible with the principle of modernity decreeing the 
dependence of the status and place of individuals on their achievement. Unless the 
entitlement promoted by ethnicity is reconciled with the competitive principle, the style 
of household politics will prevail to the detriment of public accountability and democratic 
rules.  
 One of the major reasons for the proliferation of corruption in the Ethiopian 
society is the excessive valorization of relatedness to the disadvantage of impersonal 
relations and accountability. To recognize corruption as the major scourge of the 
Ethiopian society is to admit the corrosive effect of ethnicization. Blaming 
“Bonapartism” only creates a muddle that may retard the admittance of a wrong policy, 
but does not reduce, even slightly, the evil. The present crackdown of the government on 
corruption, assuming that it is sincere, can succeed only if the system is so changed that a 
growing impersonalization of Ethiopian society takes place. This means the promotion of 
pan-Ethiopian standards in conjunction with the operation of free market relations, in 
short, the urgent need to get out of the ethnic paradigm. 
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